What future for the Quad?

 India's foreign secretary, Vikram Misri, made a visit to  Washington in April focused on reinforcing India–US  strategic, defence and commercial ties. US Secretary of State  Marco Rubio is expected to travel to Delhi in May with India  exploring the possibility of convening a meeting of Quad foreign  ministers during the visit, while internal divisions – sharpened by  President Trump’s conduct – continue to cast doubt over the  grouping’s cohesion and long-term durability.  India wants to use the Quad association to stabilise its bilateral  relationship with the US amid enduring geopolitical frictions.  The last foreign minister-level Quad engagement, which took  place in Washington in July 2025, was aimed at restoring  continuity and momentum within the quadrilateral framework. It  was expected to be followed by a summit in Delhi last November  attended by all four Quad leaders, including President Trump,  but the meeting ultimately did not materialise, marking a further  setback for the grouping. 

India–US diplomatic engagement remains central to sustaining the Quad, as New Delhi seeks to stabilise ties with Washington amid rising geopolitical friction.

Indian security and diplomatic sources indicated that Tokyo has  broadly backed efforts to accelerate Quad consultations,  reflecting its continued interest in sustaining the grouping amid  China’s growing regional assertiveness. This comes despite Trump  taunting Japan to ‘step up’ in support of Washington’s objectives  in the ongoing Iran conflict, particularly with regard to maritime  security, by providing protection to critical energy routes in the  Strait of Hormuz. The US president has portrayed Japan in  deprecating terms as benefiting from US-led security guarantees,  while remaining hesitant in its willingness to assume greater  operational responsibility – whether in mine-sweeping  operations in the besieged Strait of Hormuz, undertaking naval  escort duties, or contributing to wider security roles. 

Donald Trump meets Sanae Takaichi at the White House, where remarks referencing Pearl Harbor underscored growing unease within the Quad. 

Tellingly, Trump invoked the memory of Japan’s December 1941  attack on the US navy at Pearl Harbour during an interaction  with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi at the White House in  March. When asked by a reporter why Tokyo had not been  informed in advance of the US strikes on Iran on 28 February, he  said that surprise had been an essential element of the attack,  adding that Japan, more than most countries, should understand  this. He then remarked pointedly: ‘Who better to understand  surprise than Japan—why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?’,  directing his comment at the visibly unsettled Japanese prime  minister. 

Australia, on the other hand, while concerned at China’s  expanding military footprint in the Indo-Pacific, has adopted a  more cautious stance. Security officials and those familiar with  Quad developments said that Canberra’s reticence reflected  ‘heightened sensitivities’ over President Trump publicly singling  out Australia for ‘under-contributing’ to US military and naval  efforts in the Iran campaign, including maritime operations to  secure the Strait of Hormuz.

Strategic waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz have become focal points of tension, exposing divisions among Quad members over military responsibilities. 

Similar strains are also evident in the India–US dimension of the  Quad equation, with Delhi not immune to Trump’s caustic  rhetoric. While this has been more indirect, with the US framing  the relationship between Delhi and Washington in transactional  and trade-centric terms, it has undermined the strategic  convergence that has defined bilateral ties over the past two  decades and adversely impacted recent Quad cooperation. 

It is in this context that Misri’s US visit assumes significance, less  as a routine diplomatic engagement but more as an effort to  stabilise a relationship that remains central to the Quad at a  moment of growing uncertainty in the evolving global and  regional security order. These concerns also echo within large  segments of India’s strategic and naval community, which  constitutes a critical pillar in operationalising the Quad  framework. 

‘Through his actions and statements during the ongoing Iran  conflict, Trump has significantly eroded the Quad’s cohesion,’  said a two-star Indian Navy veteran associated with the  framework during his service years, declining to be named as he  was not authorised to speak on sensitive matters. Such behaviour,  he added, reflects what many within military and diplomatic  circles acknowledge, has revived serious doubts among Quad  members over whether the US remains a reliable and steadfast  anchor for such long-term multilateral security arrangements. 

Originating in humanitarian coordination among the Australian,  Indian, Japanese and US navies as first responders in the  aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Quad was  formally articulated in 2007, lapsed soon after under Chinese  pressure, and resurrected in 2017 amid growing concern over  Beijing’s expanding military footprint in the region.  

Warships participate in the Malabar naval exercise, a key operational pillar of Quad cooperation in maritime security and interoperability. 

Thereafter, it has functioned as a flexible, non-treaty alignment  centred on consultations, joint naval exercises, like ‘Malabar’  hosted by the Indian Navy, and cooperation in maritime security,  critical and emerging technologies, including coordinated  vaccine production during the Covid-19 pandemic. Such  flexibility, long considered one of Quad’s key strengths, is now  being tested, and its ability to absorb internal shocks – notably  unpredictable US policy signals – is also coming under increasing  strain.

Alongside this, the same set of factors that have rendered the  Quad increasingly tenuous are also beginning to undermine  AUKUS, a 2021 trilateral security partnership between Australia,  the UK and the US, that emerged as a more structured and  consequential long-term defence and technology partnership.  Aimed at deepening military and technological integration,  AUKUS is centred on enabling Australia’s acquisition of  nuclear-powered attack submarines or SSNs, alongside  cooperation in advanced domains like cyber networking, artificial  intelligence, quantum technologies and undersea and  network-centric warfare capabilities. Unlike the Quad’s looser  consultative architecture, AUKUS depends on sustained political  commitment, a great degree of industrial coordination and high  levels of strategic trust among its members. 

However, these foundations too have been largely unsettled by  Trump’s conduct amid the ongoing Iran conflict, particularly the  UK’s reluctance to join US–Israeli-led military action,  underscoring emerging strains within the AUKUS framework.  These criticisms cut across both the Quad and AUKUS, signalling  a troubling shift in US posture in which partners are increasingly  treated less as autonomous actors and more as followers,  expected to align closely with US presidential military  preferences. 

Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister of Australia; Joe Biden, then President of the United States; and Rishi Sunak, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, announce the AUKUS submarine partnership, a cornerstone defence pact now facing uncertainty amid shifting US strategic priorities. Photo: White House 

Looking ahead, the Quad’s durability – amid broader strains also  affecting AUKUS – will depend on three factors: managing  disagreements, especially those linked to President Trump and  US global actions, Washington’s ability to rebuild trust through a  more predictable and consultative approach and the willingness  of India, Japan and Australia to take greater initiative and reduce  dependence on US leadership. 

Without such recalibration, the Quad risks becoming a loosely  coordinated arrangement lacking strategic clarity, cohesion, and  geopolitical heft in the Indo-Pacific.