The state of democracy in Pakistan

A Turkish politician once remarked that while ‘most  countries have an army; in Turkey the army has a  country’. Much the same may be said of Pakistan, where the  military has become increasingly influential, not by imposing  martial law directly but by undermining and controlling the  institutions and participants of democracy. In practice, no  elected government has been able to function without the  military’s approval or survive once it challenges the armed forces. 

Pakistan’s most recent general elections were held in February  2024. So, in theory, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif now heads  a parliamentary government. But the result remains bitterly  disputed: independent observers were excluded and, before  the poll, state actors tried to prevent Imran Khan’s party from  participating by disqualifying and smearing candidates, challenging the party’s registration and banning its  cricket-bat symbol. Activists and leaders were detained and harassed. 

Khan and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), had  themselves come into power at the hands of the military  through an earlier disputed election – in 2018. Although Khan  entered politics in the late 1990s, he was unable to gain a  following until a section of military intelligence, the ISI or  Inter-Services Intelligence, took him on as a project around  2011, largely, it was understood, to counter the hold of  three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif and his party and  family in the Punjab, Pakistan’s most powerful province. 

Pakistan’s military leadership has long played a decisive role in shaping political outcomes. Photo: PPI 

Khan was initially useful to the military establishment  because he did not identify with the political or  parliamentarian class and he routinely insulted politicians,  labelling them crooks, thieves and traitors, which fitted well  with the military establishment’s ongoing narrative about  politicians. He had agitated outside parliament for four  months in 2014, bringing Islamabad to a standstill even  though he was by then an elected representative. The episode  showed how useful he had become to parts of the military  establishment in destabilising civilian politics. 

Khan was used to destabilise the government at the time – but  once he himself was in power, he began to go ‘off-piste’ and  became something of a thorn in the side of the military. He  became embroiled in a power struggle within the army top  brass, aligning himself too closely with one of the generals in  the running to succeed the then Chief of Army Staff. A  different general got the top post and soon both Khan and his allied general were in prison. Khan has been in prison for over  two years, charged in a number of cases. Nearly all Pakistan’s  elected prime ministers tend to end up either in jail or in exile. 

The 2024 general election unfolded under tight control, with allegations of restrictions on opposition participation. 

By cooperating with the army in return for office, Khan  followed the path of many Pakistani politicians: a Faustian  pact in which power is exchanged for compliance. All the  mainstream parties are now, to varying degrees, part of this  arrangement. They run national and provincial governments,  but real power still lies with the military, especially in  economic, defence and foreign policy. 

Imran Khan emerged as a powerful political force before falling out with the same establishment that once backed him. Photo: AFP 

The military view is simple: the armed forces are the reason  Pakistan is still standing and they are the only ones who can  keep it running. When the army chief General Pervez  Musharraf overthrew prime minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999 –  after the latter had sacked him – he cited the main reason as  being that the political government had been ‘intriguing to  destroy the last institution of stability left in Pakistan.

Beyond defence, the military’s expanding business interests have deepened its stake in Pakistan’s economic life. Photo: The Economic Times 

Pakistan’s military views nearly all of its neighbours (except  old ally China) with varying degrees of hostility and cites this  as a reason why there should never be any cuts in defence  expenditure. In terms of the economy, it is not just defence  expenditure it is concerned about – the military has its own,  ever-increasing interests. These have broadened and  mushroomed over the years as the military is now invested in  a number of sectors including real estate, dairy and food  products, energy and banking. These growing commercial  interests, termed ‘MilBus’ by researchers, have raised the  stakes for the army in terms of controlling the government. 

An uneasy partnership 

The partnership is uneasy. The army favours central control,  whereas the 18th amendment of 2010 devolved many powers  to the provinces. Civilian governments have also tended to  favour normalising relations with India and increasing trade,  while the military has resisted this. Western governments,  especially the United States, often profess support for  democracy while preferring to deal with military rulers. 

Pakistan has held five general elections this century. At least  two elected governments vowed to prosecute former army  chief and president Pervez Musharraf for illegally usurping  power and violating the constitution. He was charged with  treason and sentenced to death, but the Lahore High Court  later annulled the verdict. Last year parliament granted the  current army chief, General Asim Munir, lifetime immunity  from arrest and prosecution.

There are a number of red lines that the military insists not be  crossed. One is criticism of the institution and its officers.  Another is reporting on or criticising the troubled state of the  Balochistan province where there is still a nationalist  insurgency. 

Shehbaz Sharif speaks in Parliament in Islamabad, where elected leaders govern within a system widely understood to be shaped by the military’s overarching influence. Photo: AP 

So, what exactly is the state of democracy in Pakistan?

Pakistan’s democracy is an enterprise in which true power  rests with the military establishment, the ‘custodians’ of the  country. Yet, at the same time many systems and subsystems  of democracy are functioning. Elections are held, citizens turn  out to vote, voters make demands of their elected  representatives and they expect their representatives to work  for them. Even though this happens in a controlled and often  repressive environment, the appetite for a democratic  dispensation seems to exist. Despite these expectations people  realise that the final arbiter will be the military. In this respect  Pakistan resembles Myanmar: both maintain a civilian façade  under military dominance. This hybrid model may yet evolve  into a stronger democracy suited to Pakistan. Equally, by  providing civilian cover for military rule, it may further  weaken democratic institutions.