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A border on fire: Pakistan, Afghanistan and an unending war

An air strike on a hospital in Kabul on 17 March, which Taliban officials blame on Pakistan, killed more than 400 people and took the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan to a more serious level. Mediation by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey led both countries to declare a ceasefire for the Eid holiday, but there are no signs that the distrust between the neighbours is close to being resolved, as Iftikhar Firdous reports.

6-minute read

Pakistan and Afghanistan are locked in a deepening confrontation shaped by militant violence, border disputes and decades of unresolved historical mistrust.

The relationship between the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan and Pakistan has come full circle. Pakistan was once  accused by the West of supporting the Afghan Taliban, but now Pakistan accuses the Taliban of harbouring anti-Pakistan militants and facilitating cross-border attacks. This shift is  shaped by a historical dispute over the colonial Durand Line, long regarded as the de facto border between the countries. 

When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s  hope was to settle its ‘terrorism’ problem and bring an end to  the centuries-old disputes. It did not take long for Islamabad’s  anxieties to be triggered when the Taliban first cajoled  Pakistan into talking to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),  the largest faction of the Pakistani Taliban, that has claimed  responsibility for thousands of attacks inside Pakistan – and  then denied their presence in Afghanistan once the talks  failed. 

‘There are no militants in Afghanistan, there are only  refugees,’ said the late Khalil Haqqani, the minister for  refugees of the Taliban government. Haqqani was once seen as  Pakistan’s proxy within the Taliban and the statement was  widely seen in Pakistan as a betrayal. The first time Pakistan  bombed Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was just eight months  after the withdrawal of US/NATO forces in April 2022. 

The reported strike on a hospital in Kabul marked a dangerous escalation, bringing the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan to a far more serious level. Photo: Reuters 

Every time Pakistan accused its neighbour of allowing  militants to cross into Pakistan to carry out attacks, the  Taliban denied they are allowing them to operate inside  Pakistan. Initially seen as a cautious diplomatic approach to  avoid confrontation, Pakistan subsequently concluded that  the Taliban do not recognize the Durand Line as the border  demarcation. The Taliban’s official communication refers to it  as the ‘Fictional line, drawn by Durand’. 

At the centre of the dispute lies the Durand Line, the 1893 frontier that Pakistan regards as an international border but many in Afghanistan have never fully accepted. 

The dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been  shaped significantly by the historical and political controversy surrounding the concept of ‘Pashtunistan’. The roots of this  dispute lie in the contested legitimacy of the Durand Line,  now the 2640-kilometre-long international border first demarcated in 1893 between British India and the Afghan Emirate under Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan refused to recognise the Durand Line as a border, arguing that it divided ethnic Pashtun populations across two sovereign states. 

The Pashtunistan movement emerged in the mid-20th century as a political demand advocating either an independent Pashtun state or the unification of Pashtun-majority areas within Afghanistan. Afghan leaders under King Zahir Shah and later governments supported the idea diplomatically, which contributed to strained relations with Pakistan. 

A displaced Afghan family shelters in Nangarhar after fleeing clashes between Pakistani and Afghan forces at a border crossing, 4 March. Photo: Reuters. 

Pakistan has consistently maintained that the Durand Line is a  legitimate and internationally recognized boundary inherited  under the principle of uti possidetis juris that newly formed  states adopt the borders of the previous state, a doctrine often  applied in post-colonial state formation.  

Prior to the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent, leaders  supporting the Pashtunistan movement argued that Pashtuns  living in the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber  Pakhtunkhwa) and the tribal areas should be given the right to  self-determination. They believed Pashtuns should have the  choice to join Afghanistan, form an independent state, or remain with Pakistan. However, with the creation of Pakistan  and the 1947 referendum, the issue was sidelined. It lingered  mainly as a topic of discussion in the southern districts of  what is now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former Federally  Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 

During the 1950s and 1960s, tensions between Afghanistan  and Pakistan intensified, leading to frequent border disputes.  In 1973, Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan overthrew  Afghanistan's monarchy, established a republic, and assumed  the presidency. To unify the country and strengthen his rule  amid internal threats from leftist groups, Daoud revived the  Pashtunistan issue, advocating for Pashtun self-determination. 

What began as mutual mistrust and failed negotiations has hardened into a militarised frontier, with recurring attacks, ceasefires and reprisals destabilising the region. Photo: AFP 

In 1976, Daoud and Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali  Bhutto agreed to reduce support for proxies and ease the  Pashtunistan dispute, but this accord quickly collapsed after  Daoud's assassination during the 1978 Saur (April) Revolution  and Bhutto's execution in 1979. 

Despite diminished prominence, the Pashtunistan question  continues to affect Afghanistan–Pakistan relations, especially  regarding border disputes and nationalism. The Taliban's rise  brought new complexities, although in their first tenure  during the 1990’s they did not officially challenge the Durand  Line. In recent years, disputes have manifested in skirmishes  along the border and disagreements over refugee movements  and security cooperation. Pakistan constructed a border fence  and ended the autonomous status of the tribal areas, 

integrating them into mainstream Pakistan. This did not  evoke much reaction from the Ashraf Ghani government at  the time. The talks ultimately collapsed over a key demand:  the Pakistani Taliban insisted on overturning the  constitutional amendment that ended the autonomous status  of the tribal districts. This effectively revived the Pashtunistan  question in a new form, detached from its earlier leftist  framing.In other words, the Pashtunistan question had  effectively re-emerged in a new form, away from the leftist  ideals. 

Each time Pakistan has asked the Afghan Taliban to control  cross-border terrorism, the Taliban have characterised it as  ‘Pakistan’s internal problem’ while simultaneously calling for a  political settlement. By the end of 2025, three and half  thousand Pakistanis had been killed, mostly in the border  regions. 

Low-intensity attacks and intermittent ceasefires have paved  the way for an escalating conflict that risks becoming  prolonged and deeply destabilising for the region.

By Iftikhar Firdous

He is a journalist and academic. His PhD focuses on analysing militant discourses and terrorist ideologies.

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